1. Introduction and Summary. In the sixteen years that have passed since this passage from Giere appeared, there is no doubt that philosophers of statistics have taken the earlier criticisms of orthodox (or Neyman-Pearson) statistical tests seriously. But far from offering defenses for the widespread use of orthodox tests in science, most, like Rosenkrantz (1977, p. 221), have further "stressed the failure of orthodox theory to provide a satisfactory format for objective scientific reporting (or for conveying 'what the data have to tell us')." Fetzer (1981) , Kyburg (1971) and (1974), Levi (1980) , Seidenfeld (1979) , Spielman (1973) , and others have also offered arguments to strengthen already existing criticisms of the appropriateness of orthodox tests-at least so far as they are able to perform the task of statistical inference in science.
Such criticisms of orthodox tests arise from opposing views of the appropriate role of statistical tests in science. The views of the major disputants in the testing controversy fall roughly into two camps. I will refer to these as the behavioral-decision (or behavioralist) view, and the evidential-strength (or evidentialist) view.
The statistical philosophy of the first camp holds that when evidence is inconclusive all talk of "inferences" and "reaching conclusions" should be abandoned. Rather, the task of a theory of statistics is to provide rules that help guide our behavior with respect to uncertain phenomena, so that we will avoid making erroneous decisions too often in the long run of experience. Accordingly, tests are interpreted as rules of inductive behavior yielding the behavioristic model of tests, typically associated with Neyman and Pearson.
On the evidential-strength view, on the other hand, when evidence is inconclusive what is needed is some way of quantitatively assessing the extent of the evidence that particular observations afford hypotheses. On this view, the task of a theory of statistical inference is to provide an appropriate measure of evidential-relationship, which I abbreviate as an E-R measure. Examples include measures of degrees of support, belief, confirmation, corroboration, probability, and the like. Orthodox tests, whose only quantities are long-run error rates of procedures, will not be judged adequate for this task unless these error rates can be construed as providing appropriate E-R measures. Attempts at such "evidentialist" interpretations of orthodox tests give rise to what I call evidential-strength models of tests.
The problem that arises is this: If orthodox tests are interpreted and judged along the lines of the behavioristic model, then the tests appear appropriate for routine decision-theoretic tasks, where the main concern is with low long-run frequency of error. But then the tests appear inappropriate for the task of scientific inference. On the other hand, if the error rates of orthodox tests (e.g., significance levels) are interpreted as providing E-R measures (in an attempt to render tests relevant for scientific inference) tests lead to misleading and even contradictory conclusions. So, orthodox tests, if interpreted behavioristically, are inappropriate for scientific inference, and, if interpreted "evidentially," are misleading and contradictory-or so the critics allege. The general thrust of these criticisms is well captured in a passage from Fetzer (1981, p.
244):
The "preference procedures" Neyman and Pearson have proposed, in other words, may be perfectly suitable for decision-making between restricted alternatives without also fulfilling the appropriate conditions for drawing inferences on the basis of empirical evidence.
Although I take these criticisms of orthodox tests seriously, I deny that they vitiate the manner in which tests can (and very often do) serve their most important function in scientific inquiry. For, what these criticisms of tests overlook, I claim, is that the primary function of statistical tests in science is neither to decide how to behave nor to assign measures of evidential strength to hypotheses. Rather, their primary function seems to come closer to the view expressed by Kempthorne (1971, p. 492) in characterizing statistical inference "loosely as the collection of processes by which we learn from data," as well as the view of E. S. Pearson (1955, p. 204) .
While the aim of learning from incomplete data is implicit in much of actual statistical practice, it will not be possible to defend these uses of tests against the well-known criticisms until the manner in which tests serve this distinct function is made explicit. My aim in this paper is to propose a reinterpretation of a commonly used orthodox test in order to make this learning function precise.
To this end, I shall do the following: First, I shall explain, keeping mathematical details to a minimum, enough of the properties of orthodox tests so that the criticisms and proposed resolutions may be understood. Next, I shall show how these criticisms arise from both the behavioristic and the evidential-strength models of tests. Thirdly, I propose a model of tests, which, while retaining the key properties of orthodox tests, is neither behavioristic nor evidentialist (in the sense being used here). To distinguish it from these two other models of testing, I shall refer to this new interpretation as the learning model of tests. On the criterion for a "good test" that emerges, I argue, the orthodox tests are appropriate for scientific learning.
The Imagine an inquiry into a population of items, say a certain species of fish. A question that may be posed is whether this population of fish differs from some other population of fish, say in being longer (possibly one is interested in the effects of some new fish food, or wants to identify the species).' Suppose the question concerns the average length of fish in the population being studied, which we symbolize as parameter 0. One hypothesis, let us say, WC, is that 0 equals 12 inches; another, 1, is that 0 exceeds 12 inches by some unspecified amount. We want to make some observations to test these claims. Ignoring for now the problems of experimental design,2 a sample of n fish are observed and their lengths appropriately measured, say, at the longest point. A fish's length in inches may be represented by variable X; that is, to each fish a value of X (like a little badge) is attached. There are two cases where our observations would give conclusive answers to questions about the average length 0:
(1) The lengths of fish do not vary at all (for then observing a single Xvalue tells us the population average); or (2) The entire population of fish is observed and measured (for then the observed average is the population average). More realistically, the values of X are not constant, but are known to vary (among fish in the population), and typically the most we 'I deliberately divorce this illustration from any of the possible uses to which such an inquiry may be put so as to concentrate on the general interpretation of tests I will propose. A fuller discussion of an application of tests as well as more of the mathematical details occurs in Mayo (1983) . A good account of orthodox tests in general occurs in Kempthome and Folks (1971).
21 mean only that I will not explicitly discuss problems of experimental design here, not that the present treatment is inapplicable to those problems. In fact such problems can usually be dealt with by asking questions about whether certain test assumptions (e.g., independence, control of extraneous variables) are approximately met; and these questions can also be dealt with by means of orthodox tests. Thus, if we can give an adequate account of orthodox tests, we will also be giving an adequate account of a tool needed for dealing with experimental design problems.
can observe is some proper subset of the population. In these cases statistical considerations are needed for testing claims about 0.
Suppose it is known that values of X vary according to a pattern closely resembling that of a Normal distribution with an average (mean) value-0 (which is in question) and a known standard deviation u of 2. Having observed the lengths of the n fish in our sample, the most useful statistic to calculate is the average (mean) length, denoted by X in the sample; for it varies least, on the average, from the population parameter 0 of interest.3 But even if We is true and our sample does come from a population of fish whose average length 0 is 12, it does not follow that the observed average in this sample will be exactly 12. What follows is only that the most frequent observed outcome is expected to be 12 and that small differences from 12 will be more frequent than differences far from 12. This prediction can be expressed as the statistical hypothesis H: X follows the Normal distribution with mean value 0 equal to 12, and standard deviation crg (which equals cr/nl/2). A population of larger fish, on the other hand, is associated with a 0 that exceeds 12. The sort of statistical test frequently used in such an inquiry involves the following null and alternative hypotheses: where the standard deviation crg = 2/n1/2. The null hypothesis is simple, in that it specifies a single value of 0, while the alternative is composite, as it consists of the set of 0-values exceeding 12.
Since our test is devised so as to reject H just in case 0 exceeds 12, i.e., our test is one sided (in the positive direction), it seems plausible to reject H on the basis of sample averages (X values) that exceed 12 sufficiently; and this is precisely what the orthodox test recommends. That is, our test rule, which we may represent by T', rejects H just in case X is "significantly far" (in the positive direction) from hypothesized average 12, where distance is measured in standard deviation units (i.e., in zrg9s).
Denoting the observed average by Xobs, the average hypothesized by H by HH we can abbreviate its observed distance (for OH) by Dob, where 3A standard measure of the average deviation of X from 0 is the standard deviation of X, denoted by crg. If X follows the normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation In, then X also follows the normal distribution with mean 0, only now its standard deviation xr equals In divided by the square root of sample size n; i.e., X is Normal (0, lr/n1/2).
What makes statistic X so valuable is that its distribution is (approximately) Normal (0, ur/n1/2) with 0, In equal to the mean and standard deviation of the underlying distribution of X, respectively, no matter what this underlying distribution is (barring an infinite In). This is the essence of the Central-Limit Theorem. (In an extreme case where a is set at 0, the test never erroneously rejects H, since it never rejects H altogether. But, if H is false, such a test will always accept H erroneously, i.e., P = 1.) It should be noted that with a composite alternative, as in example T+, the value of P varies with different alternative values for 0, i.e., it varies according to "how false" OH is. The more discrepant 0 is from OH, the less frequent an erroneous acceptance of H occurs, i.e., the smaller is the value of P. Although introducing the second type of error helps to constrain the specifications of a test's error rates, there are still numerous ways of balancing a with P.
The task of specifying the error rates of tests is considered to lie outside the domain of the formalism of orthodox tests, and this has resulted in the tests being criticized as lacking in objectivity.6 But there is an important sense in which orthodox tests are objective; namely, they guarantee that the frequency of errors will not exceed the error rates one spec- Here, tests are formulated as mechanical rules, or "recipes" for reaching one of two possible decisions: "accept hypothesis H" or "reject H," where these are interpreted as deciding to "act as if H were true" and "act as if H were false," respectively.
Here, for example, would be such a 'rule of behavior': to decide whether a hypothesis H, of a given type, be rejected or not, calculate a specified character, x, of the observed facts; if x > xo reject H; if x ' xo, accept H. Such a rule tells us nothing as to whether in a particular case H is true when x ? xo or false when x > xo. But it may often be proved that if we behave according to such a rule . . . we shall reject H when it is true not more, say, than once in a hundred times, and in addition we may have evidence that we shall reject H sufficiently often when it is false. ( 
Can the formal apparatus of orthodox tests satisfy the criterion of [BM]?
The statement arrived at in (2.7) makes it plain that the answer is yes. For the formal apparatus of an orthodox test guarantees that the test's error rates will not exceed the values of a and I that one selects; one needs only to fix them at appropriately small values. Neyman and Pearson propose that one first fix a at some suitably small value, and then seek the test which at the same time has a suitably small P. The "best" test of a given size a (if it exists) is the one that at the same time minimizes the value of 3 (i.e., the rate of Type II errors) for all possible values of 0 under the alternative J. And the tests given in 2.5 are the "best" Neyman and Pearson tests T+ with sizes .02 and .001, respectively. However, are tests that are "good" according to behavioristic criteria (of low error-rates in the long run) also good as tools for obtaining scientific knowledge? Is test T+, for example, a good tool for finding out what is the case, as opposed to how to best behave, with respect to the lengths of a certain species or population of fish? Most philosophers of statistics say no. As Kyburg (1971, p. 82) puts it:
When it comes to general scientific hypotheses (e.g., that f(x) represents the distribution of weights in a certain species of fish . . .) then the purely pragmatic, decision theoretic approach has nothing to offer us.
The basis for their negative answers is this: It is admitted that if one is in the sort of decision-theoretic context envisioned by the behavioristic approach, then the orthodox test may be sensible. The paradigm example of such a context is acceptance sampling in industrial quality control. But in scientific contexts the behavioral interpretation of accept H and reject H seems out of place. A scientist does not seem to be in a position to specify how often he "can afford" to be wrong in some long run; nor does the low error-rate in the long-run rationale seem relevant for a scientist who is concerned with what particular inference from this experiment is warranted. Nevertheless, orthodox tests enjoy widespread use in science.
So it appears that scientists either routinely apply tests that are entirely ill suited to their needs, or else they use orthodox tests in a way that fails to be captured within the behavioristic model found in statistics texts. In reality no statistical consultant worth his or her salt simply sets up an Ulevel test, for a conventionally small o(.01 or .05), and then rejects or accepts H according to whether or not the observation is significant at level a. From the start, Pearson (1947, p. 192) declared that "no responsible statistician, faced with an investigation of this [non-routine] character, would follow an automatic probability rule." But, the still unanswered question is: How are statistical tests to be used in scientific inquiry?
Evidential-Strength Models of Statistical Tests. Existing attempts to answer this question have endorsed what I refer to as evidential-strength interpretations or models of tests.7 Such attempts arise out of an assumption that has been unquestionably accepted in discussions of philosophy of statistics; namely, that the task of a theory of statistics (in science)
is to provide some means of using data to assign hypotheses a measure of evidential strength (support, probability, reliability, degree of belief, etc.). Carnap, Hacking, Kyburg, Levi, Salmon, Seidenfeld, and others have endorsed one or another such measures of evidential relationship between data and hypotheses. I will abbreviate all such measures as E-R measures. Our purpose here is not to evaluate their separate systems (but see Mayo 1981b) but to consider the evidential-strength model of orthodox tests that arises from this tradition, and to explain in a very general way why orthodox tests fail to satisfy the testing criterion of the evidential-strength model.8 7Myself and Giere (e.g., Giere [1976] ) are exceptions but see n. 16 for some differences. Kempthorne and Folks (1971) also suggest a reinterpretation of orthodox tests in terms of a notion [consonance] that is something other than an evidential-strength measure. It should be noted that evidential-strength models of tests typically arise within attempts to criticize, rather than defend tests.
Two notable exceptions involve attempts to erect plausible E-R concepts that are based on orthodox testing ideas (i.e., error probabilities), but which avoid certain "evidentialist" criticisms. The first is the work of Birnbaum (1977) , who, unfortunately, died before fully explicating his notion of a confidence concept. The second is the standardized tail-area notion developed by Good (1982) On such an interpretation, rejecting H at significance level .02, for example, might be interpreted as: assign hypothesis H 2 percent probability, support, or other E-R measure; and assign alternative J 98 percent evidential support. But such interpretations of error frequencies, while common, are unwarranted and conflict with basic principles of orthodox tests (e.g., the frequency view of probability). The only thing a .02-rejection says about a specific rejection of H is that it was the result of a general testing procedure which erroneously rejects H only 2 percent of the time in the long run of (similar or very different) applications of the test. Since, in an orthodox testing context, parameter 0 is viewed as a fixed (yet unknown) quantity, hypotheses about it are viewed as either true or false. Thus, it makes no sense (within the orthodox context) to assign them any probabilities other than 0 or 1; that is, a hypothesis is true 100 percent of the time or 0 percent of the time, according to whether it is true or false. But so long as its truth is unknown, the only thing the orthodox test gives us are error frequencies of test rules. Probably the most flagrant and often-cited objection to using significance levels this way is that for a fixed significance level a, no matter how small, a large enough sample size can make it overwhelmingly likely that H will be rejected at that level-even on the basis of data which hardly seem to provide evidence against H.
One can easily see how this problem arises by referring to our example of test T+. An observed outcome (XObS) reaches a significance level of, say, .02, just in case Dob, exceeds 2 ug's (see 2.5(a)). And as the sample size n increases, the size of a single standard deviation uv decreases (being inversely proportional to n). Thus, any difference DobS, as small as one likes, is significantly different (from H) at level a, for as small an a as one likes, provided n is made sufficiently large. This paves the way for the following sort of "evidentialist" criticism of orthodox tests: . . .that a result which is conventionally significant at, say, 5%, can have posterior probability near to 1, so that a hypothesis can be 'rejected' when it is highly likely to be true. . . for large enough n the posterior odds on OH The explanation (for contexts such as T+) is that for sufficiently large sample size n, the Bayes factor (an E-R measure) against H (and in favor of alternative J) is approximately proportional to 1/nl12 (so long as the prior probability [density] of parameter 0 is bounded as 0 takes on alternative values approaching OH). By choosing a large enough n, even an a-significant result (were it to occur) would, for a Bayesian, provide little probabilistic support for alternatives to H, and so high support in favor of H. For detailed discussions also see Good (1980 Good ( , 1981 A test of type T + may be construed as an instrument for categorizing observed-sample averages according to the size of the mesh of a netting on which they are "caught." In our example we are interested in "catching" fish larger than those arising from a population of fish correctly described by 0 = 12. A test categorizes a sample average as "significant at level a" just in case it is caught on a size cx net; where a size cx net is one that would catch cx(100 percent) of the possible samples from a fish population where 0 = 12. We imagine that if a sample average (Xobs) is "caught" on a size ca net, then it would fall through any larger sized mesh; i.e., it is not statistically significant at any smaller size ca. The smaller the value of ca chosen for the ca-significant net, the larger the width of the netting on which the observed average must be caught-so the smaller the percentage of the fish that are caught on it.
Then specifying a test to have a small size cx is analogous to rejecting H: 0 = OH (e.g., 12) just in case a given sample of fish has an average length (Xobs) that is "caught" on a net on which only a small percentage of samples from fish population H would be caught. The rationale for a reasonably small cx is this: (5.0) If it would be very rare for so large a catch to arise in a population of fish with average length no greater than 0', then such a catch is a good indication that one is fishing from a population where 0 exceeds this value 0'. Although this justifies taking an ct-rejection of H (for small cx) as indicating that some positive discrepancy between 0 and HH has been detected; it is still not clear how the problem raised in (4. 1)* is to be avoided. For that argument shows that a rejection of H with test T+ even at a small "1If an evidential interpretation is simply seen as one in which data are used to reach true claims (about what the data convey about a statistically modeled problem) and avoid false ones (i.e., avoid misinterpreting the data), then the interpretation I propose does constitute an "evidential" interpretation. However, that term has been so closely tied to the view that a theory of statistics must provide an assessment of the evidential strength that data afford hypotheses, that it seems clearer to designate the present interpretation by means of a different term altogether. ca level, such as .02, may reflect far less of an underlying discrepancy when it arises from a test with large sample size, say n 1600, as it does from a test with a much smaller sample size, say n = 25. Let us abbreviate these two T+ tests by T+-1600 and T+-25, respectively. But, as noted in (4.1)*(iii)*, the test criterion [BM] distinguishes tests only by their long-run error-rates (i.e., their "operating characteristics"). So the report: "Reject H at level .02 with the best test of type T+," when it arose from T+-1600 would not be distinguished from its having arisen from T+-25. Clearxiy then, if one wants to distinguish the discrepancies indicated by the two .02-rejections of H, one must go beyond the criterion of the behavioral model of tests. To illustrate how the learning model does this, consider again the fishnet analogy of tests:
Imagine that two fisherman, Mr. Powers and Mr. Coarse, seek lakes with fish that are longer on the average than those in the lake in which they usually fish, call the latter Null Lake. Mr. Powers tries fishing in Lake A, Mr. Coarse, in Lake B, where for convenience they use nets rather than rods. At the end of the day each fisherman claims to have netted fish significantly larger (as measured by their average length X) than what they would typically have netted in Null Lake, whose fish average only 12 inches. Suppose it turns out that the size of the netting Mr. Powers used is far smaller than the size of Mr. Coarse's netting. Then, we would rightfully conclude that Mr. Powers had detected less of a discrepancy between the size of fish in Lake A and those of Null Lake, than Mr. Coarse found in Lake B. More specifically, suppose we find out the following. Using Mr. Coarse's net, not only is today's catch a very rare (frequency .02) occurrence when fishing in Lake Null (where 0 = 12 inches), it is also quite a rare occurrence (frequency .06) for a lake with fish averaging 12.2 inches. Then, following the principle in (5.0), Mr. Coarse's catch would indicate he was fishing in a lake where 0 exceeded 12.2.
Suppose, on the other hand, that Mr. Powers's net is far more sensitive than Mr. Coarse's. Although it is true that Mr. Powers's catch (or one even larger) would arise very rarely (only 2 percent of the time) if he had been netting in Lake Null (and so by (5.0) some discrepancy from Lake Null is indicated); say it is also true that "such a catch" (i.e., one as large or larger) occurs very frequently, (in fact 98 percent of the time) from a population of fish with average length 0 only 12.2. In other words, Mr. Powers could be expected to be as or even more excited than he is about today's catch (using his net) 98 percent of the time, even if he were fishing in a lake whose fish averaged only 12.2 inches! If he maintained that his catch indicated an average fish size 0 in excess of 12.2, we would consider him to be misconstruing his results (i.e., making great whales out of little flounders.) The principle that emerges is this: 12Construing tests in terms of the magnitudes of the discrepancies detected shows the error in the common tendency to construe a statistically significant difference with a large sample size as better evidence against the null hypothesis than with a small sample size. That researchers have very often fallen prey to such a misinterpretation is, by now, well documented (e.g., Rosenthal and Gaito [1963] have demonstrated this in a group of psychological researchers). The misinterpretation stems from construing significance levels as E-R measures (of the plausibility of the null hypothesis). The smaller the significance level, the less plausible is H, and so the more plausible is its rejection; at least on such an E-R construal of significance levels. Coupling such a construal with the greater reliability accorded to experiments as the number of observations increases, explains the tendency to deem an a-significant result with a large sample size as more impressive than one with a smaller sample size. The reason that this negative conclusion appears inescapable is the tendency to equate the statistical conclusion with a substantive scientific one, and admittedly, orthodox tests are often formulated in a manner that encourages such an identification. What follows from such an equation is that a good statistical inference is equated with a good scientific one. But if a "good" scientific test is one that indicates all and only discrepancies of interest; then a test that is "good" from the point of view of low errorrates may fail to satisfy the criterion of scientific learning. This we have already seen. But by clearly distinguishing the statistical from the scientific conclusion, it is possible to critically interpret the former's bearing on the latter. In this way the criticism of overly sensitive tests points to a possible misinterpretation of the substantive or scientific import of a statistically significant result.
In other words, a "good test on the learning model" can be understood in two ways. To avoid ambiguity, two criteria must be distinguished: In test T+, for example, an observed difference is understood to indicate 0 is positively discrepant from 0' by determining that almost none of the possible samples would give rise to such a large difference were 0 no greater than 0'. This understanding of a test result is neither a decision to behave as if 0 exceeded 0', nor an assignment of evidential strength to the hypothesis that 0 exceeds 0'. Rather it is a statement of what has been learned about how differences (like the one observed) could be generated systematically (i.e., more often than accidental effects). The statement "By fishing in Lake B using T+-25 (Mr. Coarse's net) a 'catch' (of 25 fish) with mean length as large as 12.8 inches would be generated systematically" asserts "The mean value of such catches in Lake B exceeds 12.2 inches." This is a statement about the distribution of observations (i.e., X values) that would arise if the mean of all of the (25-fish) catches from Lake B exceeds 12.2 (i.e., iff the mean of X exceeds 12.2). For it is about this (sampling) distribution that the statistical hypotheses in (2.0) refers. Admittedly, the sequence of observations to which the test result refers is likely to be hypothetical. But this does not vitiate its use as a standard way of understanding the process generating the actual observation. By learning about the mean of the distribution X, for example, one is at the same time learning about the initial scientific hypotheses (w and ?) as to whether 0, the mean length of fish in a given population exceeds 12 inches by various amounts. The reason is that the mean of X is equal to the population mean 0 (see note 3).
How does the learning model relate to more global statements of scientific knowledge? A full answer is beyond the scope of this paper, but my interpretation of test T+ provides the beginning for the answer I would suggest. For the function served by statistical tests when the quantity 0 represents mean fish lengths is much the same as when 0 represents the length of a table, the mean concentration of a hormone, the mean increased fitnesses of a given species, the mean deflection of light near the sun, and so on. For whether it is due to the incompleteness and inaccuracies of observation and measurement or the variability of the effect or system of interest, experimental data is rarely expected to agree precisely with testable predictions; even when they are derived from scientific hypotheses that adequately describe the phenomenon of interest. As such, the testable prediction may be expressed as a statement about a distribution of observations that would be expected; that is, as a statistical hypothesis about an experiment. Statistical tests then serve to detect and distinguish observed differences that are due to accidental or trivial discrepancies, from those due to systematic or substantively important ones.
To arrive at most interesting statements of scientific knowledge several individual statistical tests have to be imbedded within a larger, more com-plex model of a scientific learning-strategy. To this end, a system of "metastatistical" principles, along the lines of those developed in (5.2) for T +, may be developed for a variety of statistical tests. Then, by means of principles spanning several different theories (e.g., theories of experiment, of observation, of the primary scientific phenomenon) individual tests may be specified, interpreted, crosschecked and corrected, by reference to other statistical tests within the larger model of the given learning-effort.
To the extent that the learning-model interpretation of tests that I suggest succeeds in capturing the appropriate function of statistical methods in science, orthodox tests avoid being dethroned by their critics. If I am correct (in thinking the extent is considerable), then the challenge would be for proponents of non-orthodox methods (e.g., Bayesians, fiducialists, etc.) to show the ability of their methods to accomplish the actual tasks of experimental learning described here. In any case, my challenge might at least encourage philosophers of statistics to weigh the merits and demerits of statistical methodologies by applying them to actual inquiries.
